Kaliningrad Oblast became a region
isolated form the “mainland of the country” quite suddenly and unexpectedly. Collapse of Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union
influenced intensively on the whole oblast determining its development for
future decades. Due to that fact trough first decade after sudden change of
geopolitical situation different measures were taken to deal with the future and
development of Kaliningrad with Economic Zone as the most important one.
Talking
about Kaliningrad’s history it is crucial to say that words “future” and “development”
were not used parallel through the years, when Oblast was special military zone
with limited non-military investments.
Presently
surrounded by European Union countries and almost fully surrounded by NATO
countries, Kaliningrad Oblast is on the crossroad of its developmental way. Where
it will go and what is the possible scenario in the clash between regional
pride of so called Konigsgrad-Kalininsberg identity and anti-separatist, centralistic actions of
government in Moscow? Analysing facts, reports and documents I would like to
shortly summarise most possible scenarios for the Kaliningrad’s future.
In this short essay by the “scenario”
will be understood only possible and
affordable ideas for the future. Mentioned in the broad literature ideas of Borussia,
Fourth Baltic Republic or Special Administrative Region under common control of
Germany, Poland and Russia are not going to be discussed as impossible, unrealistic
and most of all as counter to major interest of all “actors” including Russia
herself.
Kaliningrad’s issue is taken in to
the consideration by few research and analytical institutions[1] as
well as Universities. Among all the most important and crucial, is role of Immanuel
Kant Baltic Federal University in Kaliningrad with writings of G. Fedorow[2] and
A. Klemeszew[3].
Looking abroad, in Poland most actively in the field of research about
Kaliningrad and its future, acts University of Gdańsk with writings of Tadeusz
Palmowski[4].
Revising
literature it is possible to find from 16 to 20 different scenarios considering
future of Oblast en-genera. Even though always the compromises are not fully successful
they are not doomed to failure. It is possible to suggest 4 points that are and
might be scenarios for the future of the Kaliningrad Oblast.
First
of all Russian Government would like to improve connectivity with Oblast. There are many ways of transportation, however
what seems to be crucial is the development of direct Russia to Russia
transportation corridors. Airport in Chrabrovo with all its needed infrastructure
will be developed. In speeches of regional authorities need for infrastructure development
is strongly underlined. Those plans are also written in the recent strategy for
Kaliningrad development till 2020[5].
Here we see the pressure made by central government, for economic and resource independence
of its only exclave and most western part of the country. Plans of building
Nuclear Power Plant on the territory of Oblast as well as recent suggestions of
President Vladimir Putin of building third line of Nord Stream to Kaliningrad
are the best examples of such a policy. This
seems to be general policy of Russia in order to avoid unreliable transit and
option for playing role of possible regional exporter of energy.
Second
of all, what seems to be important for local authorities with parallel interest
of Moscow is the creation of many facilities for tourists and simplification of foreign citizens movement inside the
Oblast. According to law it is still forbidden and restricted to go to the
certain places, even though they are the touristic highlights of Kaliningrad.
Measures of security are important however tourist sector wont develop without
access to the beautiful sea side around Jantarny or Baltijsk.
Third
of all, as the Special Economic Zone used to be one the basis of regional
development, local authorities desperately wants to keep at least some of the
advantages that Economic Zone gave to regional economy. Moscow wants to avoid
situation in which Kaliningrad’s economy is based on processing goods from west
and then sending them to main Russian territory. The outcome of re-thinking of
Special Economic Zone idea will be creation of such a simplifications for local
business that it would be much more efficient and self-dependent. Regulations
of New Economic Zone will create better conditions for local business for
regional demands. This will help Oblast to be much competitive without messing
with Central Government interests.
Due
to special geographical position of Kaliningrad it is crucial to underline role
of European Union in the process of its development. The local border traffic
seems to work quite efficiently however it would have negative impact on economy of Oblast if the movement would have
only one direction vector. Most of Poles spend in Russia 3 hours (time needed
to tank a car and cross the border). However on the other side lots of Russian
citizens are coming all the way up to Gdańsk to purchase various goods. At that
moment when normal tourists need to stand in line of “car gas-tanks” even up to
6 hours they are choosing different destinations for leisure. It is crucial to
improve border traffic infrastructure, because crossing points are small and inefficient.
This also could be lesson for both sides EU and Russia in their way to abolish visa
regime. What is happening presently could be just the prelude to idea presented
by G. Fedorow of EU-Russia pilotage region.
Finally, talking about Kaliningrad
and its external affairs it is important to say about NATO-Russia relations.
This topic seems to be forbidden and forgotten among the scholars. Interesting
why due to lack of real threats and real security concerns from Russian and
NATO side, relations are still tuff. Due to lack of confidence and trust among
sides mostly Washington and Moscow, Kaliningrad seems to be local hostage of
central politics. This can only change when both sides “up there” will create
something more than NATO-Russia summits but closer global security partnership.
Concluding, points one and two are
the most certain and predictable according to one additional factor –
organisation of Football World Championship in 2018 in Kaliningrad. This is one
of the main projects of the government and due to strong governmental guarantee
all infrastructure projects will be done for sure. New rules of Special
Economic Zone are also quite possible due to vital interests of local
authorities connected with its importance for citizens and by that popularity
of ruling politics. Improvement of border traffic might be unfortunately one
sided. Development of Russian border infrastructure might stopped by local
corporations and owners of big markets. Due to outflow of clients form
Kaliningrad enterprises in a favour for polish ones selling cheaper goods.
Finally as local authorities has nothing to say in a sphere of security
according to NATO-Russia relations, improvement of situation in this area seems
to be much more complex than it seems as in this relation local problems are
not applicable any more.
[2] G. Fedorow – for example – „Kaliningrad oblast of Russia in the
trasborder region south-eastern Baltic” – [in] Costal Regions, nr 19th University of Gdańsk
[4] Palmowski – he is author of
tens of publications and redactor of baltic analitical journals. Newest: “Kaliningrad – szansa czy zagrożenie dla
Europy Bałtyckiej” University of Gdańsk, Gdańsk 2013
The scenarios seem to be pretty realistic bearing in mind the current situation of the region. But I can't but pay special attention to the pessimistic point, that the improvements of border infrastructure are likely to be one-sided. With the status of a pilot region in EU-Russia relations, won't Kaliningrad do its best to ensure the success of the local border traffic regime? Besides, few accidents concerning the poor quality of infrastructure have been detected yet.
ReplyDeleteWell, the pilotage region is just an idea. What is the status quo is the huge movement of consumers to Poland. Due to the limited number of clients (around 1mln in Kaliningrad) the loss of income on Kaliningrad side sellers must be visible. Question is what would be the outcome of their dissatisfaction and whether they would be influential enough to cause border area underdevelopment. Governmental programme to improve russian sellers competitiveness might be an option.
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